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Abstract: This study examines the characteristics of  board structure that affect Chinese public firm’s
financial performance. Using a sample of  871 firms with 699 observations of  previously private firms
and 1,914 observations of  previously state-owned enterprise (SOE) firms, we investigate the differences
in corporate governance between publicly listed firms that used to be pure private firms before going
public and listed firms that used to be SOEs before their initial public offerings (IPOs). Our main finding
is that previously private firms outperform previously SOE firms in China after IPOs. In the wake of
becoming listed firms, previously SOE firms might be faced with difficulties adjusting to professional
business practices to build and extend competitive advantages. In addition, favorable policies and assis-
tance from the government to the SOE firms might have triggered complacency, especially in early years
after getting listed. On the other hand, professional savvy and acumen, combined with efficiency and
favorable business climate created by the government have probably led the previously private firms to
improve their values stronger and faster.
Abstract: Penelitian ini menguji karakteristik struktur dewan direktur yang mempengaruhi kinerja keuangan
perusahaan publik di Cina. Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel 871 perusahaan dengan 699 observasi
perusahaan yang sebelumnya perusahaan swasta murni dan 1.914 observasi perusahaan yang sebelumnya
badan usaha milik negara (BUMN). Kami menginvestigasi perbedaan-perbedaan dalam tata-kelola
perusahaan antara perusahaan publik yang sebelumnya perusahaan swasta murni menjadi perusahaan
public, dengan perusahaan publik yang sebelumnya perusahaan-perusahaan BUMN pra penawaran saham
perdana mereka di bursa efek. Temuan utama kami adalah bahwa perusahaan publik yang sebelumnya
adalah perusahaan swasta murni lebih unggul dalam hal kinerja daripada perusahaan publik yang sebelumnya
adalah perusahaan-perusahaan BUMN setelah menjadi perusahaan publik di bursa efek. Setelah penawaran
saham perdana, perusahaan publik yang sebelumnya adalah perusahaan-perusahaan BUMN tampaknya
menghadapi kesulitan dalam beradaptasi dengan praktik-praktik bisnis profesional untuk membangun
dan melebarkan keunggulan kompetitif. Selain itu, kebijakan-kebijakan yang menguntungkan dan bantuan
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dari pemerintah untuk mantan BUMN barangkali telah memicu keterlenaan, terutama pada tahun-tahun
awal setelah terdaftar di bursa efek. Di sisi lain, keahlian dan kemampuan profesional, bersama dengan
efisiensi dan iklim bisnis yang kondusif telah mendorong perusahaan publik yang dulunya perusahaan
swasta murni untuk meningkatkan nilai mereka dengan lebih kuat dan cepat.
Keywords: Chinese listed firms; corporate governance; firm performance; initial public
offerings; private firms; state-owned enterprises
JEL classifications: G30, G34, G38.
Introduction
Despite the extensive growth of the
Chinese economy, the corporate governance
systems for Chinese firms are still at the early
stage. Establishing an efficient corporate gov-
ernance system for Chinese firms has become
a pressing issue. The major challenge for cor-
porate governance reform is that China
started its governance reform efforts in an
environment where most of the elements of
a well-functioning financial market were not
in place. The Chinese government currently
encourages continuous improvements in this
area, with particular attention to improving
shareholder rights and efficiency of gover-
nance. Lu et al. (2009) find that Chinese com-
panies have been making governance
progress, and improvements in SOEs have
resulted in some initial signs of  success. Pre-
vious studies have also shown that corporate
governance improvements enhance firm
value in China (Bai et al. Zhang 2004). Xu
(2000) finds that the reform of  SOEs in
China has significantly strengthened incen-
tives, and that productivity has increased.
Discussing governance in China requires
some historical perspectives. Listed compa-
nies on the Chinese stock markets stem from
two original forms. The first is private firms,
which are essentially the same as private firms
elsewhere. The other form is SOE firms,
which are fully owned by the Chinese gov-
ernment and usually managed by govern-
ment-appointed officials either before or af-
ter they are listed on stock exchanges. SOE
firms were the only business form in China
until the early 1980s. Due to government sup-
port, SOE firms are usually larger and have
more resources than do private firms. Origi-
nally, Chinese private firms have been allowed
to operate in China only after 1980s, and they
were usually small and constrained by a vari-
ety of  regulations. Although both types of
firms are now public, their differences remain
substantial, ranging from firm size, market
share, lines of business, competitiveness, and
most importantly corporate governance effi-
ciency.
The structure of  an SOE firm has re-
sulted in complex governance issues with re-
gard to board structure and board indepen-
dence. China has adopted a quasi two-tier
board structure comprised of  a board of  di-
rectors as well as a supervisory board. How-
ever, supervisory directors are not involved
in the selection of the directors and manag-
ers, and lack the authority to supervise them
effectively. In addition, the state and major-
ity shareholders (which are usually govern-
ment agencies, holding more than half of the
total outstanding shares of  the listed firms)
still play a dominant role in the appointment
of  independent directors, chairperson, CFO,
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and senior executives. Suggestions to improve
the structure of  the board include increasing
the number of independent directors and es-
tablishing a fully independent audit commit-
tee. We argue that more attention should be
paid to independent directors who have pro-
fessional and managerial experiences and
possess certain levels of financial skills, such
as lawyers, financial analysts, and accoun-
tants.
Minority shareholders in Chinese com-
panies are a highly fragmented group of indi-
viduals. Institutional investors are small play-
ers on the Chinese stock markets. Retail in-
vestors in China, as in other markets around
the world, often lack investment knowledge
and awareness of  shareholder rights. In China,
it is difficult for individual investors to en-
force any legal rights against a listed company
for negligence or fraud. In this situation, if
independent directors can fulfill their duties
for the interest of shareholders, especially
minority shareholders, the efficiency of cor-
porate governance will be enhanced substan-
tially. It has been suggested that the provi-
sion of efficient managerial incentives may
be a crucial ingredient in the transformation
of  SOEs into more profitable modern firms.
The Chinese government is promoting equity-
based pay as one of the components of com-
pensation because it is considered a way to
motivate growth in the capital markets.
In light of the specific characteristics
of corporate governance of Chinese listed
firms, there are good reasons to conjecture
that the effectiveness of corporate gover-
nance might differ between the practices in
developed markets and those in China. These
corporate governance characteristics enumer-
ated above are often thought to be associ-
ated with poor corporate governance, which
have been ascertained in previous studies
(Gibson 2003; La Porta et al. 1998).
Based on the discussion above, we ad-
dress three issues in this paper. First, what
are the board characteristics that affect the
financial performance of  listed firms in
China? Second, due to historical differences
between SOE firms and private firms before
they went public, do private firms outperform
SOE firms, or the other way around, after
going public? Third, does the relation between
firm value and governance variables is af-
fected by the types of  firm (i.e., whether they
were previously private firms or previously
SOE firms).
In summary, our study finds that previ-
ously private firms outperform previously
SOE firms in China after IPOs. In the wake
of  IPOs, previously SOE firms might be hav-
ing difficulties adjusting to professional busi-
ness practices (e.g., hiring high-caliber execu-
tives and directors, revising company vision
or policy, changing business models toward
customer satisfaction, etc.) to establish and
leverage competitive advantages. Moreover,
favorable policies and enormous assistance
from the government to the SOE firms might
have created complacency, especially in the
early years after becoming listed firms. On
the other hand, business savvy and acumen,
combined with efficiency and conducive busi-
ness climate provided by the government,
have probably led the previously private firms
to improve their values more strongly and
faster.
We find evidence that adding more di-
rectors on the board benefits the previously
SOE firms. More educated directors are
linked to improving firm performance of  pre-
viously SOE firms after going public, and the
positive relation of  firm performance to edu-
cation has a stronger magnitude for previously
private firms. Subsequently, higher board in-
dependence benefits both types of  firms. For
a previously private firm, a higher proportion
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of independent directors on the board is
linked to an increased Tobin’s Q with a higher
magnitude than the equivalent increase for a
previously SOE firm. Higher shareholding by
top three executives or directors would lead
to increasing firm value, but this relation is
only significant for previously SOE firms.
Next, having more board meetings is valu-
able to both previously SOE and previously
private firms, with the benefit being enhanced
in the case of  previously private firms. Higher
executive compensation is more likely to be
accompanied by higher firm performance for
previously SOE firms, but not significantly
found for previously private firms.
Our study also finds that the propor-
tion of directors who used to work as gov-
ernment officials has no relation with firm
performance of  previously SOE firms, im-
plying that after IPOs the external market
plays a more pivotal role, which leads to more
professional business practices in those firms.
On the other hand, this relation is signifi-
cantly positive for previously private firms.
Accordingly, previously private firms in China
may enjoy the benefits of hiring directors with
a government official or bureaucrat back-
ground, such as getting access to government
projects, business acquaintances, etc. For pre-
viously SOE firms, the advantages of  em-
ploying this type of directors is less pro-
nounced as these firms basically had been
controlled by the government, and had en-
joyed all government projects, facilities, and
information.
There have been numerous studies that
examined the efficiency of corporate gover-
nance of  public Chinese firms. However, to
the best of our knowledge, none of the ex-
tant literature has compared the governance
of  Chinese firms based on their backgrounds,
whether they were private firms or SOEs in
origin. Our study contributes to the literature
on corporate governance systems in China
shedding light on the differences in corpo-
rate governance between previously private
firms and previously SOE firms after they
both get listed on the Chinese stock markets.
Our study extends Tong and Junarsin’s (2013)
research on corporate governance in China.
We use a more specific sample and employ
different methodologies.
The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on corporate governance of Chinese listed
firms. Data collection, research design, and
variable descriptions are expounded in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 discusses empirical meth-
ods and results. Eventually, Section 5 con-
cludes.
Literature Review on
Corporate Governance of
Chinese Firms
Research on corporate governance has
intensified in the wake of infamous financial
fraud scandals of  Enron, WorldCom, and
Parmalat, which were blamed on poor cor-
porate governance (Johnson et al. 2000). The
study on corporate governance in emerging
markets is important as institutional inves-
tors have identified it as a key factor affect-
ing their willingness to invest in those mar-
kets. In this setting, to adopt corporate gov-
ernance systems of  Western market econo-
mies, the Chinese government has promul-
gated a series of laws and regulations of cor-
porate governance. These reforms have just
been in place relatively recently, and it is still
an evolving process. The evolving governance
circumstances provide a unique opportunity
to examine current governance practices in
China, and to identify effective mechanisms.
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The largest firms in China are SOE
firms, which were established and run by
appointed officials from the government.
Among the SOE firms, some of  them have
gone public. Nevertheless, even after going
public, their governance is still similar to that
of  non-public SOE firms. For instance, after
going public, the SOE firms still enjoy sup-
ports from the government or government
agencies in a variety of ways (Liu 2005). This
unique feature gives the SOE firms an edge
in competing with private firms. However,
the management of  SOE firms is still ap-
pointed by the government, although their
boards of  directors are normally elected by
shareholders. On the contrary, private firms
in China fit the typical image of  a private firm
elsewhere, and more importantly, their gov-
ernance is largely independent from the gov-
ernment. For example, Liu (2005) describes
how the Chinese stock markets were orga-
nized by the government as a vehicle for its
SOEs to raise capital and improve operating
performance. Since the initial primary objec-
tive of the equity markets in China was to
help SOEs overcome external financing con-
straints, governance regulations that have
been introduced tend to favor SOEs. Shleifer
and Vishny (1998) propose the “grabbing
hand” argument that bureaucrats/politicians
extract resources from the listed SOEs un-
der their control to fulfill objectives that are
not consistent with firm value maximization.
With regard to studies on corporate gov-
ernance in private firms after going public,
Ren and Peng (2008) provide evidence that
private firms have improved their efficiency
in corporate governance although the im-
provement in financial performance has not
been ascertained. Wang and Shao (2007) ar-
gue that stock ownership concentrated in the
hands of blockholders affects the efficiency
of  corporate governance, and private firms
are lacking in the efficient restriction systems
on blockholders. Li (2008) documents that
inside owners do not necessarily bring ben-
efit to firm value, and even worse, inside
owners could undermine the firm value by
taking advantage of  individual shareholders.
Meanwhile, Huang et al. (2006) find that the
proportion of independent directors on pri-
vate firms’ boards is relatively higher than that
on SOE firms.
Liu (2005) documents that current cor-
porate governance practices in Chinese firms
can be best described under a control-based
model, which strikingly contrasts with the
market-oriented model commonly found in
the U.S. and U.K. Sun and Tong (2003) find
that share issue privatization is associated
with improved corporate performance. Bai et
al. (2004) show evidence that the CEO be-
ing the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of
the board, and the largest shareholder being
the government, have negative effects on firm
value. Hence, we conjecture that:
H
1
: Previously private firms outperform previously
SOE firms after they both go public.
A market-oriented governance model
might eventually take place in China. During
this process, Chinese firms’ governance sys-
tems will gradually turn out to be similar to
the systems in developed nations, such as the
U.S. Private firms are naturally closer to this
ultimate goal considering their inherent gov-
ernance characteristics. Our study purports
to investigate the differences in corporate
governance between publicly listed firms that
used to be pure private firms before going
public and public firms that used to be pure
SOEs before their IPOs. Whether private
firms outperform SOE firms, or vice versa,
in the realm of corporate governance is an
empirical question.
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For instance, large boards have been
associated with less effective monitoring
(Core et al. 1997; Jensen 1993; Yermack
1996). Sun and Zhang (2000) find that board
size is negatively related to Tobin’s Q for
Chinese firms. If  increased board size leads
to less effective monitoring, we would expect
firm performance to be the negatively asso-
ciated with board size. However, for previ-
ously SOE firms, a larger board might pro-
vide more expertise and strategic human capi-
tal much needed to reform those companies.
So, our hypotheses are:
H
2A
: Board size is negatively related to firm perfor-
mance for previously private firms.
H
2B
: Board size is positively related to firm perfor-
mance for previously SOE firms.
Subsequently, board meeting frequency
has been identified as an important dimen-
sion of  board mechanisms. However, whether
high board meeting frequency is favorable to
firm performance remains undetermined due
to mixed evidence. Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
suggest that the most widely shared problem
faced by directors is the lack of time to carry
out their duties. Similarly, Conger et al. (1998)
suggest that a board meeting is an important
resource to improve the effectiveness of the
board. An implication of those findings is that
directors that meet more frequently are more
likely to perform their duties in line with share-
holders’ interests. However, based on a
sample of  Fortune 500 firms, Vafeas (1999)
documents that the annual number of board
meetings is inversely related to firm value,
although he further finds that operating per-
formance improves following the years of
abnormal board activity. Listed firms in China
are stil l at the transitional stage; thus, for
those directors without accumulated experi-
ences in running or supervising a listed firm,
we expect the benefits of more meetings to
outweigh the costs. Therefore, we conjecture
that board meeting frequency is positively
related to firm performance.
H
3
: Board meeting frequency is positively related to
firm performance for both previously private
firms and previously SOE firms.
There are two potential approaches that
might achieve the required systems of cor-
porate governance in a transitional economy:
(1) a privatization approach and (2) a gov-
ernment-controlled approach. Empirical evi-
dence indicates that privatization has ben-
efited Chinese public firms. For example,
Zhang and Zhang’s (2003) findings show that
private firms outperform SOEs in operational
efficiency, profitability, capital structure, and
market evaluation; however, due to a wide
range of  firm qualities of  these private firms,
the potential risk of investing in these pri-
vate firms is high as well. On the other hand,
the government-controlled approach has been
advocated by Qian (1995). He argues that the
circumstances probably do not allow for the
achievement of pure privatization in present
day China. The SOEs owned by local gov-
ernments in China could report outstanding
financial performances, although the finan-
cial reports of those SOEs have been possi-
bly somewhat cooked before they are dis-
closed to the public. Obviously, this is not
the optimal system.
Considering the complexity of current
corporate governance systems in China, it is
compelling to examine the functions and roles
of independent directors in Chinese listed
firms. Traditionally, an independent director
is defined as a director who has no affiliation
with the firm except his or her directorship
(Clifford and Evans 1997), and so the inde-
pendent directors are defined in the same way
in this paper. Gao and Kling (2008) find that
outsiders on the board of directors can pre-
139
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - May-August, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013
vent operational tunneling. In another place,
Abidin et al. (2009) show that for Malaysian
firms, the ratio of  independent non-execu-
tive directors on the board has a positive im-
pact on firm performance. Having indepen-
dent non-executive directors on the board
would help monitor and control the opportu-
nistic behavior of management (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Furthermore, Brickley and
James (1987) argue that outside directors also
contribute to reducing management consump-
tion of  perquisites.
Empirically, studies on the association
between independent directors and firm per-
formance have shown mixed findings al-
though most results are still in favor of hav-
ing more independent directors on the board.
For instance, Dahya and McConnell (2003)
present evidence that investors appear to
view the appointments of outside CEOs as
good news in the U.K., and this is reflected
in the announcement period stock returns.
Furthermore, Lee et al. (1999) find that the
appointment of a financial outside director
to the board of a public corporation is asso-
ciated with positive abnormal returns among
medium-sized firms. In contrast, there are
also studies that find a negative association
between independent non-executive directors
and firm performance. Several other studies
show that independent non-executive direc-
tors do not necessarily have a positive im-
pact on firm performance (Agrawal and
Knoeber 1996; Bhagat and Black 1999), im-
plying that in some cases the independent
non-executive directors do not play their roles
effectively. In addition, Firth et al. (2008) find
that boards with a majority of outside direc-
tors are not associated with lower agency
costs. Nevertheless, the finding of  our study
substantiates the independent directors sys-
tem.
The traditional perspective on indepen-
dent directors opines that more independent
directors on the board monitor the firm more
effectively. According to the selection pro-
cedures for independent directors in China,
the independent directors are actually “out-
side directors.” Huang et al. (2006) do not
confirm the significant relation between
board independence and firm performance.
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside
directors have an incentive to act as moni-
tors of management since they want to pro-
tect their reputation as effective independent
decision makers. Weisbach (1988) finds that
boards dominated by outsiders are more likely
to replace CEOs than do insider-dominated
boards. The presence of  outside directors who
fulfill their monitoring duties could make the
degree of exposure to the market for corpo-
rate control less important. Empirical evi-
dence also shows that firm performance is
linked to board composition (Brickley and
James 1987; Byrd and Hickman 1992; and
Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). Those studies
consistently confirm that firm performance
is superior when outside directors hold a sig-
nificant percentage of  board seats. Therefore,
we conjecture that more independent direc-
tors on the board serve the firm better.
H
4
: Board independence is positively related to firm
performance for both previously private firms
and previously SOE firms.
Johnson et al. (2001) find that after
SOE firms go public, government regulations
could serve as an effective governance
mechanism, especially when the law and law
enforcement are weak. In China, since the
legal infrastructure is particularly weak, Pistor
and Xu (2005) argue that the so-called “ad-
ministrative governance” has played an ac-
tive and positive role in the development of
Chinese stock markets. However, more re-
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cent evidence indicates that government regu-
lations are also the source of  many problems.
For instance, Fan et al. (2007) find that firms
with politically connected CEOs are more
likely to have boards populated by current or
former government bureaucrats. The ac-
counting and stock return performances of
the firms run by politically connected CEOs
are poor relative to their politically uncon-
nected counterparts. Moreover, in a related
study, Chan et al. (2004) find that politicians
and state-controlling owners in China occupy
most board seats, and almost 50 percent of
the directors are appointed by the state-con-
trolling owners while another 30 percent are
affiliated with various layers of government
agencies. There are a relatively limited num-
ber of professionals (lawyers, accountants, or
finance experts) on Chinese boards.
H
5
: Politically-connected board is negatively related
to firm performance for both previously private
firms and previously SOE firms.
How to select independent directors has
become a critical issue for Chinese firms.
Accordingly, it is of  importance to investi-
gate the backgrounds of incumbent directors
in order to find the most suitable candidates
for the independent director positions. Our
study takes into account whether indepen-
dent directors have accounting expertise or
are hired from academia, and investigates the
relation between those characteristics and
firm performance. Accounting skills will fur-
nish independent directors with the expertise
to analyze financial statements and monitor
financial decision-making in the firm. Hiring
independent directors from academia has
become a routine practice in China. Academic
directors may have skills that would greatly
benefit the firm they serve. The academic
fields of those independent directors are usu-
ally related to the lines of business of the
hiring firm. Therefore, those independent di-
rectors should comprehend the business to a
sufficient extent. Kroszner and Strahan
(2001) find that board members with a bank-
ing background are effective monitors since
bankers have the expertise in strategic and
financial management. We, therefore, believe
that directors with academic, accounting, and
banking backgrounds would be effective
monitors.
H
6
: A board with more directors having academic,
accounting, and banking backgrounds is posi-
tively related to firm performance for both pre-
viously private firms and previously SOE firms.
It has been shown by a vast array of
empirical evidence that for Chinese listed
firms, duality is negatively related to firm
performance (Wu 2002; Pu and Liu 2004).
Wu et al.’s (1998) paper substantiates the
notion that there is a positive relationship
between duality and firm size. Bai et al.
(2004) find that the CEO being the Chair-
person or Vice Chairperson of the board has
a negative effect on firm value. Subsequently,
Huang et al. (2006) find that duality is more
likely to prevail in private firms than in SOE
firms. One of  the reasons is due to the his-
tory of  private firms whose founders usually
continue dominating the firm even after they
have gone public. Therefore, holding both
Chairperson and CEO position is not unusual
in private firms. However, although a founder
can hold dual positions, he or she is not nec-
essarily competent in managing the firm. In-
stead, the CEO would have enormous power
or excessive clout that might be abused.
Therefore, we expect the duality to be nega-
tively related to firm performance.
H
7
: CEO/Chair duality is negatively related to
firm performance for both previously private
firms and previously SOE firms.
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Managerial ownership is another factor
often considered in research on corporate
governance. Studies in the literature include
those that examined the cross-sectional rela-
tion between ownership and board charac-
teristics and measures of  firm performance
(Morck et al. 1988; Yermack 1996), and those
that investigated the influence of ownership
and board characteristics on specific decisions
(Weisbach 1988). Denis and Sarin (1999) find
that ownership is weakly related to the
changes in firm-specific determinants of
ownership and board structure. Meanwhile,
Core and Larcker (2002) argue that a manda-
tory increase in suboptimal equity ownership
for executives is associated with the increase
in subsequent firm performance. Research on
this area for Chinese firms in general finds
mixed evidence of the significant relation
between ownership structure and firm per-
formance. As stock options and other simi-
lar equity-based compensation measures are
increasingly implemented in China, we expect
that there is a positive relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance.
H
8
: Managerial ownership is positively related to
firm performance for both previously private
firms and previously SOE firms.
Although not examined much in previ-
ous literature, director age might be an im-
portant factor in governance. It is apparent
that older directors are usually more experi-
enced, having accumulated great amount of
knowledge and skills in business management.
Therefore, we expect that the older the aver-
age age of the board members, the better the
firm performance will be.
H
9
: Director age is positively related to firm perfor-
mance for both previously private firms and
previously SOE firms.
Similarly, we conjecture that the differ-
ences in educational backgrounds of direc-
tors are a key factor since well-educated di-
rectors could fulfill their duties better than
those directors who do not possess sufficient
educational trainings. In this study, we define
a well-educated director as one who holds a
bachelor’s degree (or above). We expect that
the higher the educational levels of  the firm’s
directors, the better is the firm performance.
H
10
: Director education is positively related to firm
performance for both previously private firms
and previously SOE firms.
The last key factor that we test is ex-
ecutive compensation. Some research (e.g.,
Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Jensen and
Murphy 1990) on executive compensation
has dealt with the issue of the relation be-
tween executive compensation and firm per-
formance, and those studies show that firm
performance is largely and positively related
to pay-for-performance sensitivity after con-
trolling for risk. For Chinese firms, the rela-
tion between executive compensation and
firm performance remains unexplored. We
expect that higher compensation motivates
the management to deliver better firm per-
formance.
H
11
: Executive compensation is positively related to
firm performance for both previously private
firms and previously SOE firms.
As discussed, these two types of  firms
are quite different. Hence, we categorize our
sample firms into two groups based on this
criterion. We then compare their corporate
governance effectiveness and efficiency. The
relation between firm performance and vari-
ous board characteristics in these two types
of  firms is investigated, and indeed this study
confirms the differences between their board
characteristics.
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Data and Variables
We collected sample firms and account-
ing data from Wind, which is a premier finan-
cial database on Chinese firms. We selected
our sample over the years of 2005-2008. In
accordance with our research objective, we
categorize our sample into two groups: (1)
previously private firms and (2) previously
SOE firms. Our final sample consists of  871
firms with 699 observations of  previously
private firms and 1,914 observations of  pre-
viously SOE firms. Data on all board char-
acteristics were collected from several board
research databases, including Wind and GTA
databases.
Dependent Variable
Our measure of  firm performance is
Tobin’s Q, computed as the sum of  total as-
sets with the difference between market value
of  equity and book value of  equity, then di-
vided by book value of  assets. Our measure
of  Q is similar to that used in Wei et al. (2005).
Tobin’s Q is probably the most often used
valuation measure in empirical research on
corporate finance. Yermack (1996) and Fan
et al. (2007) utilized Q to proxy for firm per-
formance, and find it to be an ideal measure
for firm performance. Hence, we employ Q
as the proxy for firm performance in this
study. We also use return on equity (ROE) as
an alternative proxy for firm performance,
and replicate the whole analysis process. We
find that the results essentially remain the
same.
Independent and Control
Variables
We have selected corporate governance
variables found by previous studies to be rel-
evant to corporate governance of Chinese
listed firms. These variables include firm size,
board size, firm market value, return on as-
sets (ROA), board meeting frequency, the
proportion of independent directors on the
board, CEO/Chairman duality, managerial
ownership, the proportion of  independent
directors who have accounting background,
the proportion of independent directors from
academia, the educational backgrounds of
board members, and executive compensation.
The definitions of these variables are reported
in the Appendix and discussed briefly below.
Proxies for our independent and con-
trol variables are as follows. Board size is
measured as the log of the number of direc-
tors on the board. Board meeting frequency
is measured as the log of the number of board
meetings in a certain year. Subsequently,
board independence is the percentage of in-
dependent directors on the board. We define
duality using a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the CEO and the Chair are
the same person, and zero otherwise. Mana-
gerial ownership is estimated using the log
of shareholding by the top three most highly
paid executives or directors. Director exper-
tise represents the percentage of directors
with special qual ifications. For instance, a
board’s accounting expertise is measured as
the percentage of directors with accounting
background. Another example, a board’s law
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expertise is measured as the percentage of
directors practicing law. Politically-connected
board is gauged as the percentage of direc-
tors who still or used to work as government
officials. Director age is the log of  the aver-
age age of  directors on the board. We mea-
sure director education as the proportion of
directors with a college degree. Another key
variable, i.e., executive compensation is
proxied by the log total compensation for the
top three most highly paid executives and the
log compensation for the top three most highly
paid directors.
Meanwhile, our control variables are
firm size, market value, ROA, and growth.
Firm size is proxied by log total assets. Mar-
ket value is market capitalization, which is
stock price multiplied by shares outstanding.
ROA is estimated as earnings before interest
and taxes divided by total assets. Finally, firm
growth is measured as the growth rate of the
firm’s sales.
Empirical Results
We employ both univariate and multi-
variate analyses in our tests. For the univariate
analysis, we divide the sample into previously
private firms (henceforth “private firms”).
The sample comprises 871 firms with 699
observations of  private firms and 1,914 ob-
servations of  public firms. We compare the
variables for public and private firms using
the independent sample t-tests. Table 1 be-
low summarizes the univariate analysis find-
ings.
Univariate Analysis
Univariate analysis in Table 1 shows
that public firms indeed differ from private
firms in many characteristics. Board size is
on average smaller for private firms than for
public firms, and the difference is significant
at 1 percent level. Directors of  private firms
are, on average, younger than those of pub-
lic firms. Meanwhile, the proportion of  di-
rectors holding college degrees and/or gradu-
ate education is significantly higher for pub-
lic firms than for private firms. Subsequently,
private firms are more likely to use the dual-
ity system (CEO and Chairman being the
same person) than public firms. However, the
proportion of independent directors on the
board is significantly larger for private firms
than that for public firms.
With respect to insider ownership,
shareholding by top three executives/board
members is significantly higher for private
firms. Likewise, executive/board meetings
within a year are significantly more frequent
for private firms. Interestingly, average com-
pensation of top three most highly paid ex-
ecutives is significantly and much larger for
public firms. This is perhaps supported by the
fact that public firms are significantly bigger
than private firms in terms of  market value
as well as assets. Nevertheless, Tobin’s Q of
private firms is significantly higher than that
of  public firms, suggesting that private firms
have more growth opportunities although we
do not find a significant difference in sales
growth between the two types of  companies.
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As suspected, public firms employ a
higher percentage of government officials as
directors, and this is highly significant at 1
percent level. Interestingly, we find that SOE
firms actually hire more independent direc-
tors from academia than do private firms. This
might be explained by the fact that the SOE
firms in China usually could offer more pub-
licity and fame on media to the independent
directors than could private firms. Besides,
the academics may be enticed to run govern-
ment projects pertaining to the firm in which
they are involved, which pay much more than
their salaries as professors or researchers.
Likewise, a significantly higher proportion of
directors with engineering background is
found in public firms. Eventually, the num-
ber of independent directors is higher for
public firms than that for private firms, which
is significant at 5 percent level. We try to rec-
oncile the univariate results that private firms
have a smaller board, higher proportion of
independent directors, but lower number of
independent directors on the board. This ba-
sically indicates that due to the smaller size
of  private firms’ boards, the smaller number
of independent directors still constitutes a
higher percentage of independent directors
relative to the case of  public firms. Next, we
show the unrestricted correlations among
variables in Table 2.
The correlation matrix shows that there
are several highly correlated independent vari-
ables. Board size and the number of  indepen-
dent directors are found to have a high posi-
tive relation. Compensation for top three ex-
ecutives is also positively and highly corre-
lated with compensation for top three direc-
tors. Subsequently, the proportion of  direc-
tors with accounting professor background is
highly and positively correlated with the pro-
portion of directors who used to be (or are
still) academia and the proportion of direc-
tors who have accounting background. On
the other hand, the proportion of directors
who used to be (or are still) from academia is
negatively and highly correlated with the pro-
portion of directors who used to be (or are
still) entrepreneurs. Due to several high cor-
relations among independent variables, symp-
toms of multicollinearity might appear, and
this is formally examined in the next stage of
analysis.
To check for the possible multicolli-
nearity problem, we run a preliminary regres-
sion of  Tobin’s Q on all other variables as
independent variables. If  the variance infla-
tion ratio (VIF) of a particular variable is
found to be higher than a predetermined level,
then the variable is deemed suffering from
the multicollinearity problem. The predeter-
mined level is calculated as follows:
where R2 is the coefficient of  determination
of the regression.
The regression model for multicollinearity
problem checking is constructed as follows:
Predetermined Level=            ......... (1)
1
1 - R2
Q
it
= 
0
 + 
1
ln_board_size
it
 +

2
ln_av_age
it
 + 
3
ln_av_edu
it
 +

4
duality
it
 + 
5
indep_ratio
it
 +

6
private
it
 + 
7
ln_top_value
it
 +

8
ln_meeting
it
 + 
9
ln_t3t_comp
it
 +

10
ln_t3m_comp
it
 +
11
mv
it
 +

12
ROA
it
 + 
13
sales_growth
it
 +

14
ln_asset
it
 + 
15
acc_academic
it
 +

16
large_firm
it
 + 
17
gov
it
 +

18
academic
it
 + 
19
engineer
it
 +
147
Gadjah Mada International Journal of  Business - May-August, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013
where:
Q = Tobin’s Q,
Ln_board_size = log of the number of di-
rectors in the board,
Ln_av_age = log of the average age of
directors,
Av_edu = the proportion of directors
who have college educa-
tion or above,
Duality = a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if CEO and
Chairman is the same per-
son, and 0 otherwise,
Indep_ratio = the percentage of inde-
pendent directors in the
board,
Private = a dummy variable taking
the value of  1 if  the firm
is previously a private firm
before IPO, and 0 if  the
firm is previously a public
firm,
Ln_top_value = log of the shareholding by
top three executives/
board members,
Ln_meeting = log of the times of board
meetings within the year,
Ln_t3b_comp = log of the compensation
for top three directors,
Ln_t3m_comp = log of the compensation
for top three executives,
MV = market value of  the firm,
ROA = return on assets,
Sales_growth = the growth rate of the
firm’s sales,
Ln_asset = log of  the firm’s assets,
Acc_academic = the percentage of direc-
tors who have accounting
professor background,
Large_firm = a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if it is a
large firm, and 0 other-
wise,
Gov = the percentage of direc-
tors who used to work as
government officials,
Academic = the percentage of direc-
tors who came (or are still)
from academia,
Engineer = the percentage of direc-
tors who have engineering
background,
Enterprise = the percentage of direc-
tors who used to be (or are
still) entrepreneurs,
Legal = the percentage of direc-
tors who used to be (or are
still) lawyers,
Accountant = the percentage of direc-
tors who have accounting
background,
Indep_number = the number of indepen-
dent directors,
i = firm i,
t = year t.
Results of multicollinearity test are pre-
sented in Table 3. The regression yields a
coefficient of  determination of  0.447. Ac-
cordingly, the predetermined level (calculated
by Equation 1) is 1.807, and this is then com-
pared with each variable’s VIF.

20
enterprise
it
 + 
21
legal
it
 +

22
accountant
it
 + 
23
indep_num
it
 +

it 
.............................................(2)
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Table 3. Multicollinearity Check Using VIF
This table reports the results of  preliminary regression to check for potential multicollinearity. Dependent variable is
Tobin’s Q. Independent variables are as follows. Ln_board_size is log the number of  directors on the board, Ln_av_age
is log the average age of  directors, Av_edu is the proportion of  directors with college education, Duality is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if CEO and Chairman is the same person, and 0 otherwise, Indep_ratio is the percentage
of independent directors on the board, Private is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is previously a
private firm before IPO, and 0 if  the firm is previously a public firm, Ln_top_value is log shareholding by top three
executives/board members, Ln_meeting is log the times of board meetings within the year, Ln_t3b_comp is log
compensation for top three directors, Ln_t3m_comp is log compensation for top three executives, MV is market value
of  the firm, ROA is return on assets, Sales_growth is the growth rate of  the firm’s sales, Ln_asset is log assets,
Acc_academic is the percentage of directors who have accounting professor background, Large_firm is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if it is a large firm, and 0 otherwise, Gov is the percentage of directors who used to work
as government officials, Academic is the percentage of directors who came from (or are still) academia, Engineer is the
percentage of directors who have engineering background, Enterprise is the percentage of directors who used to be (or
are still) entrepreneurs, Legal is the percentage of directors who used to be (or are still) lawyers, Accountant is the
percentage of directors with accounting background, and Indep_number is the number of independent directors.
***, **, and * denote significances at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. VIF is variance inflation
ratio.
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q
Independent Var. Coefficient t-value VIF
Intercept 3.133*** 2.61 0.0000
ln_board_size 0.285** 2.19 2.4214
ln_av_age 0.224 0.77 1.4606
av_edu 0.504*** 3.91 1.1516
duality 0.074 1.24 1.0348
indep_ratio 2.030*** 4.18 1.4632
private 0.077* 1.63 1.2694
ln_top_value 0.018** 2.35 1.1602
ln_meeting 0.420*** 7.92 1.1074
ln_t3b_comp -0.054 -1.41 2.9336
ln_t3m_comp 0.142*** 3.36 3.1357
mv 0.000*** 10.82 1.1329
ROA 4.491*** 8.96 1.2338
sales_growth 0.000 0.13 1.0150
ln_asset -0.758*** -30.60 1.8078
acc_academic 0.431 1.24 6.7643
large_firm 1.469*** 30.93 1.6363
gov 0.131 1.60 1.3208
academic -0.189 -1.24 6.8208
engineer -0.171 -1.30 1.2689
enterprise 0.006 0.27 1.6592
legal 0.037 0.29 1.1989
accountant -0.169 -0.84 3.0513
indep_num -0.031 -1.26 2.5977
Adj. R-sq. 0.442
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VIF-to-predetermined-level compari-
son provides evidence that ln_board_size,
ln_t3b_comp, ln_t3m_comp, ln_asset,
acc_academic, academic, accountant, and
indep_num might be involved in the
multicollinearity problem. This substantiates
the conjectures offered by the correlation
matrix in Table 2. In particular, board size
seems to be collinear with the number of in-
dependent directors, compensation for top
three executives tend to be collinear with
compensation for top three directors, and the
proportion of directors with accounting pro-
fessor background is  inclined to have
multicollinearity with the proportion of di-
rectors who used to be (or stil l are) from
academia and with the proportion of direc-
tors having accounting background. In an
unreported test, we also utilize another esti-
mate, which is the Eigenvalue analysis, and
the results conclude similarly.
To remedy the multicollinearity prob-
lem, techniques employed are as follows. For
the potential multicollinearity between log
board size and the number of independent
directors, we conduct the following regres-
sion:
Indep_num
it
=
 

 
+
 
ln_board_size
it 
+
 

it
.....(3)
From the regression in Equation 3, we
retain ln_board_size and 
it
 (instead of
indep_num) to be used in subsequent analy-
sis. Similarly, for the possible multicollinearity
between compensation for top three execu-
tives and compensation for top three direc-
tors, we run the following regression:
ln_t3b_comp
it
= 
 
+
 
ln_t3m_comp
it 
+

it
..........................................(4)
From Equation 4, ln_t3m_comp and 
it
are retained for further analysis. Subsequently,
the potential multicollinearity between log
assets and large firm dummy is handled us-
ing the following regression:
Large_firm
it
= 
 
+
 
ln_asset
it
 + e
it
.....(5)
where ln_asset and 
it
 from Equation 5 are
retained.
Finall y, we handle the possible
multicollinearity among the proportion of di-
rectors who have accounting professor back-
ground, the proportion of directors from
academia, and the proportion of directors
with accounting background using the follow-
ing regressions:
Accacademicit=  + academicit +


accountant
it 
+
 

it
.....(6)
Accountant
it
= + 

academic
it
 +


accacademicit + it.......(7)
where we retain Academic variable and the
error terms from Equations 6 and 7 to be uti-
lized in subsequent analysis.
Meanwhile, to control for possible
heteroskedastic nature of panel data, we ap-
ply Davidson and MacKinnon’s hetero-
skedastic-corrected robust standard errors to
get parameter estimates in all regressions in
our study.
Multivariate Analysis
The second approach to analyzing the
relation between firm performance and firm
governance for private and public firms is
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through multivariate regressions. We firstly
conduct separate regressions for both types
of  firms using the following equation:
Q
it
= 
0
 + 
1
ln_board_size
it
 +

2
r_indep_num
it
 +
3
ln_av_age
it
 +

4
av_edu
it
 + 
5
duality
it
 +

6
indep_ratio
it 
+
 

7
ln_top_value
it 
+

8
ln_meeting
it 
+ 
9
ln_t3m_comp
it 
+

10
r_ln_t3b_comp
it 
+ 
11
mv
it 
+

12
ROA
it 
+ 
13
sales_growth
it 
+

14
ln_asset
it 
+ 
15
r_large_firm
it 
+

16
r_gov
it 
+ 
17
academic
it 
+

18
r_acc_academic
it 
+

19
r_accountant
it 
+ 
20
engineer
it 
+

21
enterprise
it 
+ 
22
legal
it 
+ 
it
.....(8)
where:
Q = Tobin’s Q,
Ln_board_size= log of the number of di-
rectors in the board,
r_indep_number= the number of indepen-
dent directors, which is
the residual of regression
(3),
Ln_av_age= log of the average age of
directors,
Av_edu= the proportion of direc-
tors who have college
education or above,
Duality= a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if CEO
and Chairman is the same
person, and 0 otherwise,
Indep_ratio= the percentage of inde-
pendent directors in the
board,
Ln_top_value= log of the shareholding by
top three executives/
board members,
Ln_meeting= log of the times of board
meetings within the year,
Ln_t3m_comp= log of the compensation
for top three executives,
r_ln_t3b_comp= log of the compensation
for top three directors,
which is the residual of
regression (4),
MV= market value of  the firm,
ROA= return on assets,
Sales_growth= the growth rate of the
firm’s sales,
Ln_asset= log of  the firm’s assets,
r_large_firm= a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if it is a
large firm, and 0 other-
wise, which is the residual
of regression (5),
Gov= the percentage of direc-
tors who used to work as
government officials,
Academic= the percentage of direc-
tors who came (or are
still) from academia,
r_acc_academic= the percentage of direc-
tors who have accounting
professor background,
which is the residual of
regression (6),
r_accountant= the percentage of direc-
tors who have accounting
background, which is the
residual of regression (7),
Engineer= the percentage of direc-
tors who have engineer-
ing background,
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Enterprise= the percentage of direc-
tors who used to be (or are
still) entrepreneurs,
Legal= the percentage of direc-
tors who used to be (or are
still) lawyers,
i= firm i, and
t= year t.
Model 1 of  Table 4 shows the results
for public firms. In the case of  SOE firms,
the evidence indicates that Tobin’s Q is posi-
tively and significantly related to board size
(substantiating Hypothesis 2B), the propor-
tion of directors with college degrees or
higher (confirming Hypothesis 10), the pro-
portion of independent directors on the
board (supporting Hypothesis 4), sharehold-
-ing by top-three executives/directors (sup-
porting Hypothesis 8), the annual frequency
of  board meetings (confirming Hypothesis 3),
compensation for top-three executives (con-
sistent with Hypothesis 11), market value,
and ROA. Surprisingly, Q is positively related
to duality (not supporting Hypothesis 7),
meaning that CEO and Chairman being the
same person actually brings value to the pre-
viously SOE firms. This is perhaps contrib-
uted to by business or management culture
in the SOE firms where the unity of  com-
mand could hasten the decision-making pro-
cess, particularly when dealing with top gov-
ernment officers. Meanwhile, Tobin’s Q is
negatively associated with firm size. With
respect to director characteristics, we find
that directors with accounting background is
positively linked to firm value (confirming
Hypothesis 6), but only marginally significant
at 10 percent level. Investors may perceive
that public firms are still lacking in profes-
sional directors, especially those who under-
stand and are skillful in finance or account-
ing.
Results for private firms are reported in
Model 2 of  Table 4. For private firms, Tobin’s
Q is positively and significantly related to the
frequency of annual meetings (Hypothesis 3),
compensation for top-three executives (Hy-
pothesis 11), market value, and ROA. On the
other hand, there is a negative relationship
between Tobin’s Q and firm size as well as
sales growth. Therefore, larger private firms
with faster sales growth tend to have lower
Tobin’s Qs. However, we do not find any sig-
nificant relation between Tobin’s Q and di-
rector characteristics for the case of private
firms.
Subsequently, this study examines both
types of  firms simultaneously. Since we have
numerous independent variables (23 indepen-
dent variables excluding interaction vari-
ables), a stepwise technique is preliminarily
run to exclude independent variables that do
not meet a minimum F-statistics p-value ()
of 0.15. The stepwise regression model em-
ployed is as follows:
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where:
Q= Tobin’s Q,
Ln_board_size= log of the number of di-
rectors in the board,
r_indep_number=the number of indepen-
dent directors, which is
the residual of regression
(3),
Ln_av_age= log of the average age of
directors,
Av_edu= the proportion of directors
who have college educa-
tion or above,
Duality= a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if CEO and
Chairman is the same per-
son, and 0 otherwise,
Indep_ratio= the percentage of inde-
pendent directors in the
board,
Private= a dummy variable taking
the value of  1 if  the firm
is previously a private firm
before IPO, and 0 if  the
firm is previously a public
firm,
Ln_top_value= log of the shareholding by
top three executives/
board members,
Ln_meeting= log of the times of board
meetings within the year,
Ln_t3m_comp= log of the compensation
for top three executives,
r_ln_t3b_comp= log of the compensation
for top three directors,
which is the residual of
regression (4),
MV= market value of  the firm,
ROA= return on assets,
Sales_growth= the growth rate of the
firm’s sales,
Ln_asset= log of  the firm’s assets,
r_large_firm= a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if it is a
large firm, and 0 other-
wise, which is the residual
of regression (5),
Gov= the percentage of direc-
tors who used to work as
government officials,
Academic= the percentage of direc-
tors who came (or are still)
from academia,
r_acc_academic= the percentage of direc-
tors who have accounting
professor background,
which is the residual of re-
gression (6),
r_accountant= the percentage of direc-
tors who have accounting
background, which is the
residual of regression (7),
Engineer= the percentage of direc-
tors who have engineering
background,
Enterprise= the percentage of direc-
tors who used to be (or are
still) entrepreneurs,
Legal= the percentage of direc-
tors who used to be (or are
still) lawyers,
i = firm i, and
t = year t.
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Table 4. Separate Regressions for Previously Public and Previously Private Firms
This table presents the results of separate regressions for previously public (Model 1) and previously private firms
(Model 2). Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Independent variables are as follows. Ln_board_size is log the number
of directors on the board; r_indep_number is the number of independent directors, which is the residual of regres-
sion (3); Ln_av_age is log the average age of  directors; Av_edu is the proportion of  directors with college education;
Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if CEO and Chairman is the same person, and 0 otherwise;
Indep_ratio is the percentage of independent directors on the board; Private is a dummy variable taking the value of
1 if  the firm is previously a private firm before IPO, and 0 if  the firm is previously a public firm; Ln_top_value is log
shareholding by top three executives/board members; Ln_meeting is log the times of board meetings within the year;
Ln_t3m_comp is log compensation for top three executives; r_ln_t3b_comp is log compensation for top three
directors, which is the residual of  regression (4); MV is market value of  the firm; ROA is return on assets; Sales_growth
is the growth rate of  the firm’s sales; Ln_asset is log assets; r_large_firm is a dummy variable taking the value of  1 if
it is a large firm, and 0 otherwise, which is the residual of regression (5); Gov is the percentage of directors who used
to work as government officials; Academic is the percentage of directors who came from (or are still) academia;
r_acc_academic is the percentage of directors who have accounting professor background, which is the residual of
regression (6); r_accountant is the percentage of directors who have accounting background, which is the residual of
regression (7); Engineer is the percentage of directors who have engineering background; Enterprise is the percentage
of directors who used to be (or are still) entrepreneurs; and Legal is the percentage of directors who used to be (or are
still) lawyers. t-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significances at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Var.: Q Previously Public Previously Private
Independent Var. (1) (2)
Intercept -0.064 6.322***
(-0.05) (3.11)
ln_board_size 0.186* -0.100
(1.77) (-0.53)
r_indep_num -0.022 -0.001
(-0.75) (-0.03)
ln_av_age 0.429 0.063
(1.28) (0.12)
av_edu 0.568*** 0.190
(3.63) (0.93)
duality 0.133* -0.033
(1.83) (-0.35)
indep_ratio 1.748*** 1.200
(3.05) (1.44)
ln_top_value 0.022** 0.003
(2.25) (0.23)
ln_meeting 0.370*** 0.360***
(6.18) (3.61)
ln_t3m_comp 0.095*** 0.091*
(2.89) (1.74)
r_ln_t3b_comp -0.046 -0.103
(-1.11) (-1.29)
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Table 4 (Continued)
Dependent Var.: Q Previously Public Previously Private
Independent Var. (1) (2)
mv 0.000*** 0.000***
(9.98) (14.45)
ROA 3.765*** 3.546***
(6.55) (3.90)
sales_growth 0.004 -0.018*
(0.69) (-1.65)
ln_asset -0.329*** -0.873***
(-13.03) (-16.66)
r_large_firm 1.373*** 1.420***
(25.32) (16.42)
gov 0.053 0.227
(0.58) (1.39)
academic 0.006 0.009
(0.06) (0.06)
r_acc_academic 0.984 0.498
(1.50) (0.39)
r_accountant 0.704* -0.952
(1.80) (-1.45)
engineer -0.098 -0.367
(-0.67) (-1.41)
enterprise 0.025 -0.012
(0.99) (-0.32)
legal -0.016 0.295
  (-0.11) (1.31)
N 1,914 699
Adj. R-sq. 0.410 0.628
F-value 60.66*** 53.80***
Findings of the regression above are
documented in Table 5. Results from the
stepwise regression provide information that
12 independent variables fulfill the minimum
criterion of F-statistic p-value of 0.15. These
variables are r_large_firm, ln_asset, mv,
ROA, ln_meeting, ln_t3m_comp, indep_ ra-
tio, av_edu, ln_top_value, g ov, ln_
board_size, and private. The 12 variables are
subsequently utilized in the main regressions.
The coefficients on the proportions of direc-
tors who have accounting, academic, account-
ing professorship, entrepreneurial, engineer-
ing, and law backgrounds are weakly related
to Tobin’s Q.
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Table 5. Stepwise Regression Analysis
This table shows the results of preliminary stepwise regression analysis to remove variables that do not meet the
minimum requirement of  F-statistics p-value of  0.15. Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, and all other variables are
independent variables. Ln_board_size is log the number of directors on the board; r_indep_number is the number of
independent directors, which is the residual of  regression (3); Ln_av_age is log the average age of  directors; Av_edu is
the proportion of directors who have college education; Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if CEO and
Chairman is the same person, and 0 otherwise; Indep_ratio is the percentage of independent directors on the board;
Private is a dummy variable taking the value of  1 if  the firm is previously a private firm before IPO, and 0 if  the firm is
previously a public firm; Ln_top_value is log shareholding by top three executives/board members; Ln_meeting is log
the times of board meetings within the year; Ln_t3m_comp is log compensation for top three executives; r_ln_t3b_comp
is log compensation for top three directors, which is the residual of  regression (4); MV is market value of  the firm; ROA
is return on assets; Sales_growth is the growth rate of  the firm’s sales; Ln_asset is log assets; r_large_firm is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if it is a large firm, and 0 otherwise, which is the residual of regression (5); Gov is the
percentage of directors who used to work as government officials; Academic is the percentage of directors who came
from (or are still) academia; r_acc_academic is the percentage of directors who have accounting professor background,
which is the residual of regression (6); r_accountant is the percentage of directors who have accounting background,
which is the residual of regression (7); Engineer is the percentage of directors who have engineering background;
Enterprise is the percentage of directors who used to be (or are still) entrepreneurs; and Legal is the percentage of
directors who used to be (or are still) lawyers. ***, **, and * denote significances at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
Dependent Var.
Tobin’s Q
Step Independent Var. Model R-sq. F-value
1 r_large_firm 0.336 1306.84***
2 ln_asset 0.364 112.29***
3 mv 0.393 124.56***
4 ROA 0.415 92.90***
5 ln_meeting 0.431 75.54***
6 ln_t3m_comp 0.436 19.72***
7 indep_ratio 0.440 18.15***
8 av_edu 0.442 11.61***
9 ln_top_value 0.443 5.32**
10 gov 0.444 2.98*
11 ln_board_size 0.444 2.36
12 private 0.445 1.93
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To analyze our panel data, we employ
all panel regression techniques: (1) pooled,
(2) random effects, and (3) fixed effects re-
gressions. As reported in Table 6, we find that
Breusch-Pagan’s Lagrange Multiplier (LM)
test statistic is not significant while Hausman
specification test statistic is highly significant
at 1 percent level, suggesting that the use of
fixed effects models are the most efficient of
all. Nonetheless, we present results from all
models for comparison purposes. The regres-
sion equation used is:
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where:
= firm fixed effect,
Q= Tobin’s Q,
Ln_board_size= log of the number of direc-
tors in the board,
Av_edu= the proportion of directors
who have college education
or above,
Indep_ratio= the percentage of indepen-
dent directors in the board,
Private= a dummy variable taking
the value of  1 if  the firm is
previously a private firm
before IPO, and 0 if  the
firm is previously a public
firm,
Ln_top_value= log of the shareholding by
top three executives/board
members,
Ln_meeting= log of the times of board
meetings within the year,
Ln_t3m_comp= log of the compensation for
top three executives,
MV= market value of  the firm,
ROA= return on assets,
Ln_asset= log of  the firm’s assets,
r_large_firm= a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if it is a large
f ir m, and 0 otherwise,
which is the residual of re-
gression (5),
Gov= the percentage of directors
who used to work as gov-
ernment officials,
i = firm i,
t = year t.
Regression results are presented in
Table 6. Models 1, 3, and 5 are produced by
regressions without interaction variables.
Fixed effects model (Model 5) yields a posi-
tive and significant coefficient on the private
dummy, suggesting that after IPOs, previ-
ously private firms outperform previously
public firms in China. This finding substanti-
ates Hypothesis 1. In the wake of IPOs, the
previously public firms might be faced with
difficulties adjusting to professional business
practices (e.g., hiring high-caliber executives
and directors, revising company vision or
policy, changing business models toward cus-
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tomer satisfaction, etc.) in order to establish
and leverage competitive advantages. Since
the Chinese government has emphasized the
goal of extending the dominance of SOE
firms in the most underpinning industries
even after they go public, favorable policies
and enormous assistance from the govern-
ment to the SOE firms might create compla-
cency, especially in early years after becom-
ing publicly listed firms. On the other hand,
business savvy and acumen, combined with
efficiency and general economic freedom pro-
vided by the government have probably led
the previously private firms to improve their
values stronger and faster relative to their
previously SOE firms counterparts.
Table 6. Main Regression Results
This table presents the evidence from main regressions. Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Independent variables are as
follows. Ln_board_size is log number of  directors on the board; Av_edu is the proportion of  directors with college
education; Indep_ratio is the percentage of independent directors on the board; Private is a dummy variable taking the
value of  1 if  the firm is previously a private firm before IPO, and 0 if  the firm is previously a public firm; Ln_top_value
is log shareholding by top three executives/board members; Ln_meeting is log the times of board meetings within the
year; Ln_t3m_comp is log compensation for top three executives; MV is market value of  the firm; ROA is return on
assets; Ln_asset is log assets; r_large_firm is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if it is a large firm, and 0 otherwise,
which is the residual of regression Equation 5; Gov is the percentage of directors who used to work as government
officials. Models 1 and 2 are based on pooled regressions, Models 3 and 4 random effects regressions, and Models 5 and
6 fixed effects regressions. All models employ Davidson and MacKinnon’s heteroskedastic-robust parameter estimates.
t-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significances at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Dependent Var.: Q Pooled RE FE
Independent Var.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 2.093*** 2.192*** 1.673*** 1.824*** -4.905*** -3.948***
(6.80) (6.36) (4.88) (4.75) (-4.64) (-3.50)
ln_board_size 0.142 0.183* 0.120 0.159 -0.025 -0.077
(1.63) (1.85) (1.23) (1.43) (-0.12) (-0.33)
av_edu 0.467*** 0.498*** 0.472*** 0.478*** 0.469 0.060
(3.80) (3.23) (3.36) (2.73) (1.21) (0.14)
indep_ratio 1.766*** 1.597*** 2.021*** 1.821*** 2.858*** 2.131***
(4.35) (3.26) (4.64) (3.48) (4.38) (2.78)
private 0.058 -0.377 0.071 -0.593 0.269* -2.928**
(1.31) (-0.54) (1.39) (-0.78) (1.78) (-2.24)
ln_top_value 0.017** 0.024** 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.188*** 0.216***
(2.32) (2.45) (2.82) (2.87) (7.76) (7.04)
ln_meeting 0.401*** 0.340*** 0.478*** 0.415*** 0.558*** 0.505***
(7.74) (5.68) (8.72) (6.56) (7.04) (5.64)
ln_t3m_comp 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.133*** 0.123*** 0.549*** 0.511***
(3.45) (2.83) (4.27) (3.42) (8.87) (6.97)
mv 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(10.12) (7.84) (9.00) (5.15) (8.12) (5.07)
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Table 6 (Continued)
Dependent Var.: Q Pooled RE FE
Independent Var.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ROA 4.260*** 4.244*** 4.316*** 4.306*** 4.676*** 4.666***
(8.78) (8.69) (8.39) (8.32) (6.33) (6.30)
ln_asset -0.374*** -0.376*** -0.369*** -0.370*** 0.216** 0.219**
(-17.15) (-17.10) (-14.78) (-14.70) (2.48) (2.51)
r_large_firm 1.487*** 1.483*** 1.438*** 1.433*** 1.050*** 1.041***
(31.72) (31.60) (31.00) (30.86) (19.21) (19.01)
gov 0.135* 0.067 0.159* 0.087 0.323* 0.232
(1.87) (0.82) (1.95) (0.94) (1.67) (1.09)
private * ln_board_size -0.137 -0.121 0.140
(-0.67) (-0.53) (0.34)
private * av_edu -0.078 -0.006 1.451**
(-0.30) (-0.02) (2.19)
private * indep_ratio 0.392 0.516 2.334*
(0.44) (0.54) (1.71)
private * ln_top_value -0.015 -0.019 -0.049
(-1.01) (-1.13) (-1.25)
private * ln_meeting 0.245** 0.257** 0.188
(2.10) (2.09) (1.12)
private * ln_t3m_comp 0.033 0.051 0.140
(0.56) (0.80) (1.27)
private * gov 0.325* 0.341* 0.260
    (1.86)   (1.75)   (0.70)
N 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613
Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
R-sq. 0.443 0.445 0.435 0.437 0.684 0.687
Breusch-Pagan LM 0.54 0.53
Hausman         302.80*** 313.01***
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With regard to results differentiating
previously SOE firms from previously private
firms, findings are documented in Models 2,
4, and 6, which contain interaction variables
involving the private dummy and governance
variables. We find evidence that board size is
significantly and positively related to firm
values of  previously SOE firms, but this re-
lation is not significant for previously private
firms as shown by the insignificant coefficient
on the interaction between private and board
size variables. Adding more directors on the
board clearly benefits the previously SOE
firms as those directors would bring more
expertise and experiences. The proportion of
directors with college education is positively
related to Tobin’s Q for previously SOE
firms, but only significant in pooled and ran-
dom effects models. Accordingly, more edu-
cated directors might improve firm perfor-
mance of  previously SOE firms after going
public. The interaction between the private
dummy and av_edu variables has a signifi-
cantly positive relationship with firm perfor-
mance in fixed effects model, implying that
the positive link of  firm performance to col-
lege education has a stronger magnitude for
private firms. Subsequently, the proportion
of independent directors on the board has a
significantly positive relation with firm per-
formance for previously SOE firms. Indepen-
dent directors indeed benefit those firms by
contributing expertise as well as independent
opinions. The coefficient on interaction vari-
able involving a private dummy and the pro-
portion of independent directors variables is
also significantly positive. Thus, for a previ-
ously private firm, a higher proportion of  in-
dependent directors on the board might be
linked to an increased Tobin’s Q with a higher
magnitude than the equivalent increase for a
previously SOE firm.
Inside ownership by top three executives
or board members is positively and signifi-
cantly associated with Tobin’s Q for previ-
ously SOE firms. Higher shareholding by the
top three executives or board members would
lead to stronger sense of  ownership, which
in turn would increase firm value. However,
the relation between firm performance and
shareholding by top three executives or di-
rectors is not significant for previously pri-
vate firms. Next, the relation between firm
performance and the number of  board meet-
ings is also positive and highly significant for
previously SOE firms. Likewise, this relation
is significantly positive, with stronger inten-
sity, in pooled and random effects models for
previously private firms. Therefore, more
board meetings are obviously valuable to both
previously SOE and previously private firms,
with the benefit being enhanced in the case
of  previously private firms.
The coefficients on average compensa-
tion for top three executives are positive and
highly significant for previously SOE firms.
This suggests that higher compensation might
enhance executives’ morale to manage pre-
viously SOE firms more eagerly so as to
maximize shareholder wealth. Meanwhile, the
interaction of average compensation to a pri-
vate dummy is not significant. We also find
that the proportion of directors who used to
work as government officials has no impact
on firm values of  previously SOE firms. This
implies that after IPOs, the external market
plays a more pivotal role, and this eventually
leads to more professional business processes
and competition in the previously SOE firms.
Meanwhile, when this variable is interacted
with a private dummy, the coefficient on the
interaction turns out to be significantly posi-
tive. Accordingly, previously private firms in
China may enjoy the advantages of hiring
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directors with a government official or bu-
reaucrat background, such as getting access
to government projects, business channels,
and other benefits. On the other hand, the
role of this type of directors is less pro-
nounced in the previously public firms since
these firms basically had been controlled by
the government, and had enjoyed all state
projects, facilities, and information.
With respect to accounting perfor-
mance, ROA is positively related to Q, and
as expected the relation is strongly significant
in all regressions. Subsequently, the relation
between firm size and firm performance is
significantly positive. Fixed effects models
find a positive relation between Tobin’s Q
and firm size, through both log assets and
large-firm dummy variables.
Robustness Check
In this section, we investigate the pos-
sibility of endogeneity on the private dummy
variable. It is likely that whether a Chinese
firm was an SOE firm or a private firm right
before our analysis period was related with
how well it had performed in years before.
Thus, as a robustness check, we utilize the
following regression equation:
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where:
Q= Tobin’s Q,
Ln_board_size= log of the number of direc-
tors in the board,
Av_edu= the proportion of directors
who have college education
or above,
Indep_ratio= the percentage of indepen-
dent directors in the board,
Private= a dummy variable taking
the value of  1 if  the firm is
previously a private firm
before IPO, and 0 if  the
firm is previously a public
firm,
Ln_top_value= log of the shareholding by
top three executives/board
members,
Ln_meeting= log of the times of board
meetings within the year,
Ln_t3m_comp= log of the compensation for
top three executives,
MV= market value of  the firm,
ROA= return on assets,
Ln_asset= log of  the firm’s assets,
r_large_firm= a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if it is a large
f ir m, and 0 otherwise,
which is the residual of re-
gression (5),
Gov= the percentage of directors
who used to work as gov-
ernment officials,
i = firm i,
t = year t.
We conduct two regression models: (1)
two-stage least squares (2SLS) and (2) lim-
ited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
methods. Using regression Equation 11, a
private dummy variable is instrumented by
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lagged values of  Tobin’s Q (first and second
lags). If the private dummy is indeed endog-
enous, thereby being related to previous pe-
riods’ Tobin’s Q, then the coefficient on 
1
should be significant. This approach to
checking for potential endogeneity has been
recommended by Bateman and Strasser
(1983) and used in prior research (Davidson
et al. 1997, among others).
Table 7. Robustness Check
This table reports the robustness check regarding potential endogeneity. Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Independent
variables are as follows. Private is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is previously a private firm before
IPO, and 0 if  the firm is previously a public firm; Ln_board_size is log the number of  directors on the board; Av_edu
is the proportion of directors who have college education; Ln_top_value is log shareholding by top three executives/
board members; Ln_meeting is log the times of board meetings within the year; Ln_t3m_comp is log compensation
for top three executives; MV is market value of  the firm; ROA is return on assets; Ln_asset is log assets; r_large_firm is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if it is a large firm, and 0 otherwise, which is the residual of regression (5); Gov
is the percentage of directors who used to work as government officials. Private dummy variable is instrumented with
lagged values of  Tobin’s Q (lag 1 and lag 2). t-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significances at 1
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Var.: Q 2SLS LIML
Independent Var. (1) (2)
Intercept 75.942 354.629
  (0.48) (0.21)
private -46.029 -224.746
  (-0.45) (-0.21)
ln_board_size -9.417 -47.089
  (-0.44) (-0.20)
av_edu -16.370 -84.203
  (-0.42) (-0.20)
indep_ratio 19.110 87.980
  (0.46) (0.21)
ln_top_value 0.925 4.484
  (0.46) (0.21)
ln_meeting 8.419 40.597
  (0.46) (0.21)
ln_t3m_comp -2.919 -14.661
  (-0.43) (-0.20)
mv 0.000 0.000
  (0.56) (0.22)
ROA 68.099 289.033
  (0.54) (0.21)
ln_asset -5.255 -23.317
  (-0.51) (-0.21)
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As reported in Table 7, there is no sig-
nificant relation between firm performance
and the private dummy (instrumented by two
lagged values of  firm performance) in both
2SLS and LIML models. Therefore, panel data
regression techniques, as employed in the
previous section, are more appropriate to ex-
amine the association of  firm performance
to the private dummy and all other explana-
tory variables. Moreover, the results of  Table
7 imply that endogeneity should not be of
concern in our study.
Conclusion
This study examines the corporate gov-
ernance of  Chinese listed firms. Using 871
firms comprised of  699 observations of  pre-
viously private firms and 1,914 observations
of  previously public firms, we find that there
are differences between previously private
firms and previously public firms, not only
in their corporate governance but also in the
relation between firm performance and board
characteristics, after they go public. Theoreti-
cally, listed firms are conjectured to be ho-
mogenous with respect to their board char-
acteristics and corporate governance, but in-
terestingly our findings show significant dif-
ferences in various aspects of governance and
board characteristics. Our study contributes
to the literature on corporate governance sys-
tems in China. Specifically, this paper sheds
light on the differences in corporate gover-
nance between previously private firms and
previously SOE firms after they both get
listed on the Chinese stock markets.
Our findings are summarized as follows.
We find that board size is smaller for previ-
ously private firms than for previously pub-
lic firms. Directors of  previously private firms
are on average younger. Meanwhile, the pro-
portion of directors with college education
or higher is significantly lower for previously
private firms. It is also evident that previously
private firms are more likely to use the dual-
ity system (CEO and Chairman being the
same person) than do previously public firms.
However, the proportion of independent di-
rectors on the board is significantly higher for
previously private firms. Regarding insider
ownership, shareholding by top three execu-
tives or directors is significantly higher for
previously private firms. Market value of
equity of  previously public firms is much
larger than that of  previously private firms.
However, Tobin’s Q of  previously private
firms is significantly higher, indicating that
Table 7 (Continued)
Dependent Var.: Q 2SLS LIML
Independent Var. (1) (2)
r_large_firm -0.265 -5.022
  (-0.08) (-0.16)
gov -8.080 -39.944
  (-0.44) (-0.21)
N 871 871
R-sq. 0.002 0.000
F-value 0.15 0.01
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previously private firms perform better than
do previously SOE firms in creating value
for shareholders. Sales growth is significantly
higher for previously private firms, implying
that they have the potential and therefore
grow faster. Meanwhile, previously SOE firms
employ a higher percentage of government
officials as directors, and this is consistent
with the common practice in China. Interest-
ingly, we find that previously SOE firms ac-
tually hire more independent directors from
academia than do private firms. Likewise, a
significantly higher proportion of directors
with engineering background is found in pre-
viously SOE firms. Finally, the number of
independent directors is marginally higher for
previously SOE firms than that for previously
private firms. Due to the smaller board size
of  previously private firms, the smaller num-
ber of independent directors still constitutes
a higher percentage of independent directors
relative to the case of  previously SOE firms.
We investigate the relation between
board characteristics and firm performance
measured as Tobin’s Q for sample firms. We
find evidence that previously private firms
outperform previously SOE firms in China
after IPOs. In the wake of  IPOs, previously
SOE firms might be having difficulties ad-
justing to professional business practices (e.g.,
hiring high-caliber executives and directors,
revising company vision or policy, changing
business models toward customer satisfac-
tion, etc.) to build and extend competitive
advantages. In addition, favorable policies and
assistance from the government to the SOE
firms might have engendered complacency,
especially in the early years after becoming
listed firms. On the other hand, professional
savvy and acumen, combined with efficiency
and favorable business climate created by the
government have probably led the previously
private firms to improve their values more
strongly and faster.
Our findings show that board size is
positively related to the firm values of  previ-
ously SOE firms, but this relation is not sig-
nificant for previously private firms. The pro-
portion of directors with college education
is positively related to Tobin’s Q for previ-
ously SOE firms, and this positive link is
even stronger in magnitude for previously
private firms. Furthermore, board indepen-
dence has a positive relation with firm per-
formance for previously SOE firms. For a
previously private firm, a higher percentage
of independent directors on the board is
linked to an increased Tobin’s Q with a higher
magnitude than the equivalent increase for a
previously SOE firm. Shareholding by top
three executives or directors is positively as-
sociated with Tobin’s Q for previously SOE
firms. However, the relation between firm
performance and inside ownership by top
three executives or board members is not sig-
nificant for previously private firms. There is
a positive relation between firm performance
and the number of board meetings for both
types of  firms, with stronger intensity for pre-
viously private firms.
We also find a positive association be-
tween firm performance and average com-
pensation for top three executives for previ-
ously SOE firms, but not for previously pri-
vate firms. Eventually, the proportion of  di-
rectors who used to work as government of-
ficials has no relation with firm performance
of  previously SOE firms, which suggests that
after IPOs, the external market plays a more
pivotal role that leads to more professional
business practices in those firms. On the other
hand, this relation is significantly positive for
previously private firms. Accordingly, previ-
ously private firms in China may reap ben-
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efits of hiring directors with a government
official or bureaucrat background, such as
getting access to government projects, busi-
ness acquaintances, etc. For previously SOE
firms, the advantages of  employing this type
of  directors is less pronounced as these firms
basically had been controlled by the govern-
ment, and had enjoyed a ll government
projects, facilities, and information.
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